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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a securely precoded
OFDM (SP-OFDM) system for efficient and reliable transmission
under disguised jamming, where the jammer intentionally mis-
leads the receiver by mimicking the characteristics of the autho-
rized signal, and causes complete communication failure. More
specifically, we bring off a dynamic constellation by introducing
secure shared randomness between the legitimate transmitter
and receiver, and hence break the symmetricity between the
authorized signal and the disguised jamming. We analyze the
channel capacities of both the traditional OFDM and SP-OFDM
under hostile jamming using the arbitrarily varying channel
(AVC) model. It is shown that the deterministic coding capacity of
the traditional OFDM is zero under the worst disguised jamming.
On the other hand, due to the secure randomness shared between
the authorized transmitter and receiver, SP-OFDM can achieve a
positive capacity under disguised jamming since the AVC channel
corresponding to SP-OFDM is not symmetrizable. A remarkable
feature of the proposed SP-OFDM scheme is that while achieving
strong jamming resistance, it has roughly the same high spectral
efficiency as the traditional OFDM system. The robustness of
the proposed SP-OFDM scheme under disguised jamming is
demonstrated through both theoretic and numerical analyses.
Index Terms—OFDM, disguised jamming, arbitrarily varying
channel, channel capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless systems, one of the most commonly used
techniques for limiting the effectiveness of an opponent’s
communication is referred to as jamming, in which the autho-
rized user’s signal is deliberately interfered by the adversary.
Along with the wide spread of various wireless devices,
especially with the advent of user configurable intelligent
devices, jamming attack is no longer limited to battlefield or
military related events, but has become an urgent and serious
threat to civilian communications as well.
In literature [1]–[4], jamming has widely been modeled
as Gaussian noise. Based on the noise jamming model and
the Shannon capacity formula, C = B log(1 + SNR), an
intuitive impression is that jamming is really harmful only
when the jamming power is much higher than the signal power.
However, this is only partially true. More recently, it has been
found that disguised jamming [5]–[8], where the jamming is
highly correlated with the signal, and has a power level close
or equal to the signal power, can be much more destructive
than the noise jamming; it can reduce the system capacity to
zero even when the jamming power equals the signal power.
Consider the following example:
R = S + J +N
where S is the authorized signal, J the jamming interference,
N the noise independent of J and S, and R the received
signal. If the jammer is capable of eavesdropping on the
symbol constellation and the codebook of the transmitter, it
can simply replicate one of the sequences in the codebook
of the legitimate transmitter, the receiver, then, would not be
able to distinguish between the authorized sequence and the
jamming sequence, resulting in a complete communication
failure [9, ch 7.3].
Orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM), due
to its high spectral efficiency and robustness under fading
channels, has been widely used in modern high speed multi-
media communication systems [10], such as LTE and WiMax.
However, unlike the spread spectrum techniques [11], OFDM
mainly relies on channel coding for communication reliability
under hostile jamming, and has very limited built-in resilience
against jamming attacks [12]–[18]. For example, in [12], the
bit error rate (BER) performance of the traditional OFDM was
explored under full-band and partial band Gaussian jamming,
as well as multitone jamming. It was shown that OFDM is
quite fragile under jamming, as BER can go above 10−1
when the jamming power is the same as the signal power.
In [15]–[17], the jamming attacks aiming at the pilots in
OFDM systems were studied. It was shown that when the
system standard is public and no encryption is applied to
the transmitted symbol sequence, pilot attacks can completely
nullify the channel estimation and synchronization of OFDM,
and hence result in complete communication failure. Most
existing work [12], [13], [17] has been focused on the jamming
attacks which damage OFDM by minimizing the signal-to-
interference power ratio (SIR). In this paper, we identify
the threat to OFDM from the disguised jamming: when the
jamming interference is also OFDM modulated, the receiver
can easily be deceived into synchronizing with the jamming
interference instead of the legitimate signal, hence paralyzing
the legitimate transmission.
In [14], the anti-jamming performance of Frequency
Hopped (FH) OFDM system was explored. Like the traditional
FH system, this approach achieves jamming resistance through
large frequency diversity and sacrifices the spectral efficiency
of OFDM. In [18], a collision-free frequency hopping (CFFH)
scheme was proposed, where the basic idea was to randomize
the jamming interference through frequency domain interleav-
ing based on secure, collision-free frequency hopping. The
most significant feature of CFFH based OFDM is that it is
very effective under partial band jamming, and at the same
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2time, has the same spectral efficiency as the original OFDM.
However, CFFH based OFDM is still fragile under disguised
jamming [6]–[8], [19].
To combat disguised jamming in OFDM systems, a pre-
coding scheme was proposed in [8], where extra redundancy
is introduced to achieve jamming resistance. However, lack
of plasticity in the precoding scheme results in inadequate
reliability under cognitive disguised jamming. As OFDM
being identified as a major modulation technique for the 5G
systems, there is an ever increasing need on the development
of secure and efficient OFDM systems that are reliable under
hostile jamming, especially the destructive disguised jamming.
If we examine disguised jamming carefully, we can see
that the main issue there is the symmetricity between the
authorized signal and the jamming interference. Intuitively, to
design the corresponding anti-jamming system, the main task
is to break the symmetricity between the authorized signal and
the jamming interference, or make it impossible for the jammer
to achieve this symmetricity. For this purpose, encryption or
channel coding at the bit level will not really help, since the
symmetricity appears at the symbol level. That is, instead
of using a fixed symbol constellation, we have to introduce
secure randomness to the constellation, and utilize a dynamic
constellation scheme, such that the jammer can no longer
mimic the authorized user’s signal. At the same time, the
authorized user does not have to sacrifice too much on the
performance, efficiency and system complexity.
Motivated by the observations above and our previous
research on anti-jamming system design [6]–[8], [18], [20],
in this paper, we propose a securely precoded OFDM (SP-
OFDM) system for efficient and reliable transmission under
disguised jamming. By integrating advanced cryptographic
techniques into OFDM transceiver design, we design a dy-
namic constellation by introducing shared randomness be-
tween the legitimate transmitter and receiver, which breaks the
symmetricity between the authorized signal and the jamming
interference, and hence ensures reliable performance under
disguised jamming. A remarkable feature of the proposed SP-
OFDM scheme is that it achieves strong jamming resistance,
but has the same high spectral efficiency as the traditional
OFDM system. Moreover, the change to the physical layer
transceivers is minimal, feasible and affordable. The robust-
ness of the proposed SP-OFDM scheme under disguised
jamming is demonstrated through both theoretic and numerical
analyses.
More specifically, the main contributions of this paper can
be summarized as follows:
• We design a highly secure and efficient OFDM sys-
tem under disguised jamming, named securely precoded
OFDM (SP-OFDM), by exploiting secure symbol-level
precoding basing on phase randomization. The basic idea
is to randomize the phase of transmitted symbols using
the secure PN sequences generated from the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm. The security is
guaranteed by the secret key shared only between the
legitimate transmitter and receiver. While SP-OFDM
achieves strong jamming resistance, it does not introduce
too much extra coding redundancy into the system and
can achieve roughly the same spectral efficiency as the
traditional OFDM system.
• We identify the vulnerability of the synchronization al-
gorithm in the original OFDM system under disguised
jamming, and propose a secure synchronization scheme
for SP-OFDM which is robust against disguised jamming.
In the proposed synchronization scheme, we design an
encrypted cyclic prefix (CP) for SP-OFDM, and the
synchronization algorithm utilizes the encrypted CP as
well as the precoded pilot symbols to estimate time and
frequency offsets in the presence of jamming.
• We analyze the channel capacity of the traditional OFDM
and the proposed SP-OFDM under hostile jamming using
the arbitrarily varying channel (AVC) model. It is shown
that the deterministic coding capacity of the traditional
OFDM is zero under the worst disguised jamming. At
the same time, we prove that with the secure randomness
shared between the authorized transmitter and receiver,
the AVC channel corresponding to SP-OFDM is not
symmetrizable, and hence SP-OFDM can achieve a pos-
itive capacity under disguised jamming. Note that the
authorized user aims to maximize the capacity while the
jammer aims to minimize the capacity, we show that the
maximin capacity for SP-OFDM under hostile jamming
is given by C = log
(
1 + PSPJ+PN
)
bits/symbol, where
Ps denotes the signal power, PJ the jamming power and
PN the noise power.
Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of the proposed system under disguised jamming
and channel fading. Potentially, SP-OFDM is a promising
modulation scheme for high speed transmission under hostile
environments. Moreover, it should be pointed out that the
secure precoding scheme proposed in this paper can also be
applied to modulation techniques other than OFDM.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The design
of the proposed SP-OFDM system is described in Section II.
The synchronization procedure of SP-OFDM is presented in
Section III. The symmetricity analysis and capacity evaluation
of SP-OFDM are presented in Section IV. Numerical examples
are provided in Section V and we conclude in Section VI.
II. SECURE OFDM SYSTEM DESIGN UNDER DISGUISED
JAMMING
In this section, we introduce the proposed anti-jamming
OFDM system with secure precoding and decoding, named
as securely procoded OFDM (SP-OFDM).
A. Transmitter Design with Secure Precoding
The block diagram of the proposed system is shown in
Fig. 1. Let Nc be the number of subcarriers in the OFDM
system and Φ the alphabet of transmitted symbols. For i =
0, 1, · · · , Nc − 1 and k ∈ Z, let Sk,i ∈ Φ denote the symbol
transmitted on the i-th carrier of the k-th OFDM block1.
1In literature, the term OFDM symbol is often used to denote the symbol
block transmitted in one OFDM symbol period. In this paper, to avoid the
ambiguity with the data symbols transmitted at each subcarrier, we choose to
use the term OFDM block instead.
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We denote the symbol vector of the k-th OFDM block by
Sk = [Sk,0, Sk,1, · · · , Sk,Nc−1]T . The input data stream is
first fed to the channel encoder, mapped to the symbol vector
Sk, and then fed to the proposed symbol-level secure precoder.
As pointed out in [7], [20]–[22], a key enabling factor for
reliable communication under disguised jamming is to intro-
duce shared randomness between the transmitter and receiver,
such that the symmetry between the authorized signal and
the jamming interference is broken. To maintain full spectral
efficiency of the traditional OFDM system, the precoding is
performed by multiplying an invertible Nc × Nc precoding
matrix Pk to the symbol vector Sk, i.e.,
S˜k = PkSk. (1)
In this paper, we design the precoding matrix Pk to be a
diagonal matrix as
Pk = diag(e
−jΘk,0 , e−jΘk,1 , · · · , e−jΘk,Nc−1). (2)
That is, a random phase shift is applied to each transmitted
symbol; more specifically, for i = 0, 1, · · · , Nc − 1 and
k ∈ Z, a random phase shift −Θk,i is applied to the symbol
transmitted on the i-th carrier of the k-th OFDM block. The
phase shift changes randomly and independently across sub-
carriers and OFDM blocks, and is encrypted so that the
jammer has no access to it. More specifically, {Θk,i} is
generated through a secure phase shift generator as shown in
Fig. 2. The secure phase shift generator consists of three parts:
(i) a pseudo-noise (PN) sequence generator; (ii) an Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) [23] encryption module; and (iii)
an M -PSK mapper.
The PN sequence generator generates a pseudo-random
sequence, which is then encrypted with AES. The encrypted
sequence is further converted to PSK symbols using an M -
PSK mapper, where M is a power of 2, and every log2M
bits are converted to a PSK symbol. To facilitate the syn-
chronization process, the PN sequence generator is initialized
in the following way: each party is equipped with a global
time clock, and the PN sequence generators are reinitialized at
fixed intervals. The new state for reinitialization, for example,
TsTCP,2TCP,1
180°  phase shift
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Fig. 3: An OFDM waveform example with secure cyclic
prefix, illustrated with a 180◦ phase shift on CP1.
can be the elapsed time after a specific reference epoch in
seconds for the time being, which is public. As the initial state
changes with each reinitialization, no repeated PN sequence
will be generated. The security, as well as the randomness of
the generated phase shift sequence, are guaranteed by the AES
encryption algorithm [23], for which the secret encryption key
is only shared between the authorized transmitter and receiver.
Hence, the phase shift sequence is random and unaccessible
for the jammer. The resulted symbol vector from the secure
precoding, S˜k, is then used to generate the body of OFDM
block through IFFT, whose duration is Ts.
In OFDM transceiver design, the synchronization module
plays a crucial role: OFDM requires both accurate time and
frequency synchronization to avoid inter-symbol interference
(ISI) and inter-carrier interference (ICI). In SP-OFDM, we
propose a cyclic prefix (CP) based synchronization algorithm,
as in traditional OFDM. However, SP-OFDM differs in that
its CP is encrypted to ensure the security under disguised
jamming.
B. Cyclic Prefix Design with Secure Precoding
In traditional OFDM, CP has three major functions: (i)
eliminating the ISI between neighboring blocks; (ii) converting
the linear convolution of OFDM block body with the channel
impulse response into circular convolution under multi-path
channel fading; and (iii) eliminating the ICI introduced by
multipath propagation. As CP is a copy of the tail of OFDM
block body, we can calculate the correlation between CP and
the tail of OFDM block to estimate the starting point of each
OFDM block [24] when disguised jamming is absent.
However, as to be shown in Section III, the traditional CP
based synchronization is fragile under disguised jamming. As
shown in Fig. 3, to ensure the robustness of synchronization,
in SP-OFDM, we apply a secure phase shift to part of the
CP for each OFDM block. More specifically, the CP of each
OFDM block is divided into two parts: for the first part, with a
duration of TCP,1, a secure phase shift is applied to the signal.
We name this part of CP as CP1; while for the second part,
which is of length TCP,2, no special processing is applied.
We name the second part as CP2. CP1 is used for effective
synchronization under disguised jamming; CP2 maintains the
functions of the original CP. To avoid ISI and ICI, both TCP,1
and TCP,2 are chosen to be longer than the maximum delay
spread of the channel.
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Fig. 4: The waveform of uk(t) with Ck = −1.
To ensure the security, the phase shift applied to CP1 is en-
crypted and varies for each OFDM block. The corresponding
secure phase shift sequence can be generated using the same
phase shift generator proposed in Fig. 2, with a much lower
generation rate, since only one phase shift symbol is needed
per OFDM block. Let sk(t) denote signal of the k-th OFDM
block in the time domain by aligning the beginning of the
OFDM block body at t = 0, and Ck denote the phase shift
symbol applied to its CP1; let u(t) be the unit step function,
TCP = TCP,1 + TCP,2 and Ts denote the duration of OFDM
block body. Define function uk(t) as
uk(t)
4
= Ck[u(t+TCP )−u(t+TCP,2)]+u(t+TCP,2)−u(t−Ts).
(3)
An example of uk(t) with Ck = −1 is plotted in Fig. 4. For
SP-OFDM with secure CP, sk(t) can be expressed as
sk(t) =
1
Nc
Nc−1∑
i=0
S˜k,ie
j 2piiTs tuk(t), (4)
where S˜k,i = Sk,ie−jΘk,i . Let Tb = Ts + TCP denote the
duration of an OFDM block. Then the entire OFDM signal in
the time domain can be expressed as
s(t) =
∞∑
k=−∞
sk(t− kTb). (5)
Even though the receiver can generate identical phase shift
sequences used in CP1 generation from the design of Fig.
2, there will still be an offset between the two generated
sequences considering the delays in communication and the
mismatch between the time clocks. Let Ck and C˜k denote the
phase shift symbols generated at the transmitter and receiver
respectively, and we have
Ck = C˜k+k0 ,∀k. (6)
Since the phase shift sequences are generated from the global
time clock, the offset k0 is bounded. The offset k0 can
be estimated by the synchronization module at the receiver.
Note that synchronization is needed for the precoding matrix
sequence Pk as well; for the ease of synchronization, we pair
the CP phase shift symbol Ck with the precoding matrix Pk for
each OFDM block k; that is, for each CP phase shift symbol
generated, we generate Nc phase shift symbols in parallel
as the sub-carrier phase shifts. In this way, the two phase
shift sequences are synchronized, in the sense that once the
synchronization on the CP phase shift sequence is obtained,
the synchronization on the precoding matrices is achieved
automatically.
C. Receiver Design with Secure Decoding
We consider an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channel under hostile jamming. The transmitted OFDM signal
is subject to an AWGN term, denoted by n(t), and an additive
jamming interference x(t). The received OFDM signal can be
expressed as
r(t) = s(t− t0)ej(ω0t+φ0) + x(t) + n(t), (7)
where t0, ω0 and φ0 denote the time, frequency and phase off-
sets between the transmitter and receiver, respectively. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that t0 ∈ [0, Tb).
As in the traditional OFDM system, the synchronization
module of SP-OFDM consists of two stages: a pre-FFT
synchronization, which makes use of the correlation between
the secure CP and the OFDM body tail to roughly estimate
the offsets, and a post-FFT synchronization, which makes use
of the pilot symbols inserted to certain sub-carriers to obtain
a fine estimation. The phase shift offset k0 is also estimated
in the pre-FFT stage. The detailed algorithm and analysis on
the synchronization of SP-OFDM will be presented in Section
III.
The demodulation module at the receiver will crop the CP to
obtain the body of each OFDM block, and apply FFT to obtain
the frequency component at each sub-carrier. Under perfect
synchronization, the received signal of the k-th OFDM block
body can be expressed as
rk(t) = sk(t) + xk(t) + nk(t), t ∈ [0, Ts), (8)
where xk(t) and nk(t) are the jamming interference and noise
overlaid on the k-th OFDM block, respectively. The frequency
components of jamming and noise can be calculated as
Jk,i =
Nc−1∑
m=0
xk(
mTs
Nc
)e−j
2pii
Nc
m, i = 0, 1, · · · , Nc − 1, (9)
N¯k,i =
Nc−1∑
m=0
nk(
mTs
Nc
)e−j
2pii
Nc
m, i = 0, 1, · · · , Nc − 1, (10)
where TsNc is the sampling interval. For an AWGN chan-
nel, N¯k,i’s are i.i.d. circularly symmetric complex Gaus-
sian random variables with variance σ2. After applying
FFT to the received signal, a symbol vector R˜k =
[R˜k,0, R˜k,1, · · · , R˜k,Nc−1]T is obtained for the k-th transmit-
ted OFDM block. That is,
R˜k = PkSk + Jk + N¯k. (11)
where
Jk = [Jk,0, Jk,1, · · · , Jk,Nc−1]T , (12)
and
N¯k = [N¯k,0, N¯k,1, · · · , N¯k,Nc−1]T . (13)
The secure decoding module multiplies the inverse matrix
of Pk to R˜k, which results in the symbol vector
Rk = Sk + P
−1
k Jk + P
−1
k N¯k, (14)
where Rk = [Rk,0, Rk,1, · · · , Rk,Nc−1]T , with
Rk,i = Sk,i + e
jΘk,iJk,i +Nk,i, (15)
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Fig. 5: Correlation coefficients of the original OFDM under
disguised jamming.
where Nk,i = ejΘk,iN¯k,i, and Θk,i is uniformly distributed
over { 2piiM | i = 0, 1, · · · ,M − 1}. Note that for any circularly
symmetric Gaussian random variable N , ejθN and N have
the same distribution for any angle θ [25, p66]; that is,
Nk,i is still a circular symmetric complex Gaussian random
variable of zero-mean and variance σ2. Taking the delay in
the communication system into consideration, in this paper,
we assume that the authorized user and the jammer do not
have pre-knowledge on the sequence of each other.
III. SYNCHRONIZATION IN SP-OFDM UNDER DISGUISED
JAMMING
In this section, first, we show the vulnerability of the
synchronization process in tradition OFDM under disguised
jamming attacks; then we propose the synchronization algo-
rithm of SP-OFDM and prove its effectiveness under hostile
jamming.
In modern OFDM systems, there are generally two kinds
of approaches to achieve signal synchronization: (i) making
use of the correlation between the CP and the tail of each
OFDM block [24]; or (ii) inserting certain training symbols
in every OFDM frame [26]. However, neither of these two
approaches is robust under malicious jamming, especially
disguised jamming, where the jammer modulates the inference
with OFDM and deceive the receiver into synchronizing with
the disguised jamming instead of the legitimate signal. For
the training sequence based synchronization approach, even if
the training sequence is not public, there is still a chance for
the jammer to eavesdrop on the training sequence, and then
generate the OFDM modulated disguised jamming with the
true training sequence.
Synchronization of traditional OFDM under disguised
jamming: To demonstrate the damage of disguised jamming,
we calculate the CP based correlation coefficients of the
traditional OFDM signal at different time offsets in the AWGN
channel under an OFDM modulated disguised jamming. We
average the correlation coefficients over multiple OFDM
blocks, and the result is shown in Fig. 5. Without proper
encryption applied to the signal, the legitimate signal and
the jamming interference are completely symmetric; we can
observe peaks of the correlation coefficients at two different
time offsets, one corresponding to that of the legitimate signal
and the other corresponding to that of the disguised jamming.
If the jamming power is the same as the signal power, then
the probability that the receiver chooses to synchronize with
jamming is 50%. Obviously, a complete communication failure
occurs when the receiver chooses to synchronize with the
disguised jamming instead of the legitimate signal.
To address this problem, in the synchronization algorithm
of SP-OFDM, we apply encrypted phase shifts to the sub-
carriers and CP. For the ease of analysis, in the following,
we consider an AWGN channel model; the effectiveness of
the proposed algorithm in multi-path fading channels will
be verified through numerical analysis in Section V. Even
though our goal is to guarantee the robustness of SP-OFDM
under disguised jamming, in the following analysis, we do not
assume any specific form on the jamming interference x(t),
that is, we prove the robustness of our algorithm under any
form of jamming attacks. Without loss of generality, we denote
the combined term of jamming and noise as z(t) = x(t)+n(t),
and the received signal can be expressed as
r(t) = s(t− t0)ej(ω0t+φ0) + z(t). (16)
A. Pre-FFT Synchronization
In the pre-FFT stage, we estimate the encrypted phase
shift sequence offset k0, time offset t0 and the fractional part
of w0Ts/2pi for frequency offset w0. Since the phase shift
sequence Ck is generated from the global time clock, the
receiver has rough bounds on k0 relative to the arrival time of
the signal. We denote the finite candidate set of offset k0 by
K.
In the traditional OFDM system, the CP correlation based
synchronization algorithm is derived from the maximum-
likelihood (ML) rule [24], [27]. However, since the jamming
distribution is unspecified in our case, the ML rule is not appli-
cable. Instead, we prove the robustness of the synchronization
algorithm of SP-OFDM using the Chebychev inequality [28,
Theorem 5.11].
In the pre-FFT stage, the receiver calculates the following
correlation coefficient
Yk(τ, d)
4
=
∫ τ−TCP,2+kTb
τ−TCP+kTb
r(t)r∗(t+ Ts)C˜∗k+ddt, k ∈ Z∗,
(17)
for τ ∈ [0, Tb), d ∈ K. We have the following proposition on
Yk(τ, d), whose proof is given in the appendix.
Proposition 1. If the fourth moment of z(t) is bounded for
any time instant t, i.e., E{|z(t)|4} < ∞,∀t ∈ R, then as
K → +∞, we have
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
Yk(τ, d) =

PS
Nc
v(τ + Tb − t0)e−jω0Ts , d = k0 − 1,
PS
Nc
v(τ − t0)e−jω0Ts , d = k0,
PS
Nc
v(τ − Tb − t0)e−jω0Ts , d = k0 + 1,
0, otherwise,
(18)
almost surely (a.s.), where
v(τ)
4
=
 τ + TCP,1, −TCP,1 ≤ τ < 0,TCP,1 − τ, 0 ≤ τ < TCP,1,
0, otherwise,
(19)
6and PS is the average symbol power of constellation Φ.
Basing on Proposition 1, to estimate t0 and k0, we search
for τ and d which can maximize | 1K
∑K−1
k=0 Yk(τ, d)| for some
K. Meanwhile, after we obtain t0 and k0, the phase of the
average correlation coefficient 1K
∑K−1
k=0 Yk(t0, k0) is
− w0Ts mod 2pi, (20)
where we can estimate the fractional part of w0Ts/2pi as
well. In practice, the jamming interference should be peak
power bounded considering the constraints in RF, so we
can ensure that the fourth moment of z(t) is bounded. The
selection of K depends on the power and the form of the
jamming interference. In Section V, we will show that under
a disguised jamming, SP-OFDM is able to obtain relatively
accurate estimation results with 25 to 30 OFDM blocks.
As in the traditional OFDM, the CP based synchronization
is only able to provide a coarse estimation of time offset
t0, especially under multi-path fading, and it requires a fine
estimation on the time offset at the post-FFT stage. In addition,
from (21), it can be seen that even for a very minor estimation
error on the carrier frequency, there still may be an essential
phase offset. As long as the range of the time estimation error
is smaller than the duration of CP2, without loss of generality,
we can model the signal after pre-FFT synchronization as
r′(t) = s(t− t′0)ej(
2pi(n0+ζ0)
Ts
t+φ0) + z′(t), (21)
where z′(t) is the jamming interference after pre-FFT syn-
chronization, t′0 ∈ [0, TCP,2) is the remaining time offset,
2pi(n0 + ζ0)/Ts is the remaining frequency offset, n0 is an
integer and |ζ0|  1.
B. Post-FFT Synchronization
In this stage, we first estimate n0 + ζ0 after demodulating
the synchronized signal r′(t) in (21) using FFT. Suppose n0
satisfies
Nl ≤ n0 ≤ Nu, (22)
where integers Nl and Nu are determined by the maximal
frequency offset between the transmitter and receiver. Basing
on (21), to demodulate the k-th OFDM block, the receiver
applies FFT to signal r′(t) within interval [kTb, kTb + Ts).
The received signal of k-th OFDM block after alignment can
be expressed as
r′k(t) = sk(t−t′0)ej(
2pi(n0+ζ0)
Ts
t+φk)+z′k(t), t ∈ [0, Ts), (23)
where
φk = φ0 +
2pi(n0 + ζ0)Tb
Ts
k, (24)
and
z′k(t) = z
′(t+ kTb). (25)
Considering the frequency offset n0, the receiver samples
the received signal with a sampling frequency Nc+Nu−NlTs . Let
N ′c
4
= Nc + Nu − Nl. For 0 ≤ i < N ′c, the FFT applied to
r′k(t) can be expressed as
Rk(i) =
N ′c−1∑
m=0
r′k(
mTs
N ′c
)e
−j 2pii
N′c
m
=
ejφk
Nc
N ′c−1∑
i′=0
S˜k,i′
e−j
2pit′0
Ts
i′(1− ej2piζ0)
1− ej
2pi(n0+ζ0+i
′−i)
N′c
+ Z ′k(i), (26)
where
Z ′k(i) =
N ′c−1∑
m=0
z′k(
mTs
N ′c
)e
−j 2pii
N′c
m
. (27)
Since we assume |ζ0|  1, for 0 ≤ i < N ′c, we can neglect
the ICI in (26) and approximate Rk(i) as
Rk(i) =
N ′c
Nc
ejφke−j
2pit′0
Ts
[(i−n0) mod N ′c]S˜′k,i−n0 + Z
′
k(i),
(28)
where
S˜′k,i =
{
S˜k, (i mod N ′c), 0 ≤ i mod N ′c < Nc,
0, otherwise.
(29)
The post-FFT synchronization generally utilizes the pilot
symbols inserted at certain sub-carriers. For the ease of
analysis, we assume a pilot symbol p is placed at sub-carrier
ip of each OFDM block. Note that, as the precoding matrix
sequence is synchronized with the CP phase shift sequence,
the precoding matrix sequence is synchronized at the receiver
after pre-FFT synchronization. We calculate the following
correlation coefficients for each OFDM block k:
Γk(i)
4
= Rk(i)R
∗
k+1(i)e
j(Θk,ip−Θk+1,ip ). (30)
We have the following proposition on Γk(i).
Proposition 2. If the fourth moment of z(t) is bounded for
any time t, then as K → +∞, we have
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
Γk(i)
=
{(
N ′c
Nc
)2
ej
2pi(n0+ζ0)Tb
Ts |p|2, i = n0 + ip mod N ′c ,
0, otherwise,
a.s..
(31)
Proof. Note that Γk(i) can be derived as
Γk(i) = [(N
′
c/Nc)
2
ej
2pi(n0+ζ0)Tb
Ts S˜′k,i−n0 S˜
′∗
k+1,i−n0
+
N ′c
Nc
ejφk S˜′k,i−n0Z
′∗
k+1(i) +
N ′c
Nc
ejφk+1 S˜′∗k+1,i−n0Z
′
k(i)
+ Z ′k(i)Z
′∗
k+1(i)]e
j(Θk,ip−Θk+1,ip ). (32)
Since the phase shifts Θk,i’s are independent across the sub-
carriers, following the approach in the pre-FFT analysis, we
have
E{Γk(i)}=
{(
N ′c
Nc
)2
ej
2pi(n0+ζ0)Tb
Ts |p|2, i = n0+ip mod N ′c,
0, otherwise.
(33)
7while the variance of 1K
∑K−1
k=0 Γk(i) converges to 0 as
K → +∞. Therefore (31) is obtained accordingly. We skip
the details here for brevity.
Following Proposition 2, n0 can be estimated by finding the
i which maximizes 1K
∑K−1
k=0 Γk(i). With the n0 obtained, we
can further estimate the frequenecy estimation error ζ0 in the
pre-FFT stage by evaluating the phase of 1K
∑K−1
k=0 Γk((n0+ip)
mod N ′c).
After n0 is estimated, without loss of generality, we can
assume n0 = 0 in the following derivation. In terms of the
time offset t′0, given two pilot symbols p1 and p2 located at
sub-carriers ip1 and ip2 , respectively, we evaluate the following
correlation coefficient for each OFDM block k:
Υk(ip1 , ip2) = Rk(ip1)R
∗
k(ip2)p
∗
1p2e
j(Θk,ip1
−Θk,ip2 ), (34)
and we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If the fourth moment of z(t) is bounded for
any time t, then as K → +∞, we have
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
Υk(ip1 , ip2)=
(
N ′c
Nc
)2
e−j
2pit′0
Ts
(ip1−ip2 )|p1|2|p2|2,
(35)
a.s.
The proof of Proposition 3 follows a similar approach
as Proposition 1, and we skip it for brevity. Note that
t′0 ∈ [0, TCP,2), so t′0 can be estimated from the phase of
1
K
∑K−1
k=0 Υk(ip1 , ip2). Likewise, the phase offset φ0 can be
estimated by averaging Rk(ip)ejΘk,ip after compensating for
the frequency offset.
Discussions: Note that under disguised jamming, the
estimator averages multiple OFDM blocks to make use of
the encrypted signal for an accurate synchronization. In prac-
tice, estimation errors always exist in synchronization, so the
receiver has to keep track of all the offsets, which can be
implemented by the moving average approach.
The pre-FFT synchronization exploits the correlation be-
tween secure CP and the OFDM body tail. The data-aided
synchronization approach, i.e., inserting independent training
sequence in each OFDM frame, is still an option under
disguised jamming if encryption is applied to the training
sequence. However, the CP based approach experiences less
delay in synchronization. By inserting secure CP for each
OFDM block, it is easier to keep track of the time offset
continuously.
In the post-FFT stage, inserting more pilots can accelerate
the synchronization process; meanwhile, under fading chan-
nels, the channel estimation process necessitates pilot symbols
over different sub-carrier locations. Channel estimation can be
implemented by averaging the received pilot symbols at each
sub-carrier location following the approach in synchronization.
However, an important point here is that for time varying
channels, the duration of the OFDM blocks used for averaging
should be smaller than the coherence time so that the channel
does not change significantly during each estimation. This is
guaranteed in practical systems where the whole OFDM frame
duration is shorter than the channel coherence time [26].
IV. SYMMETRICITY AND CAPACITY ANALYSIS USING THE
AVC MODEL
In this section, we analyze the symmetricity and capacity of
the proposed SP-OFDM system using the arbitrarily varying
channel (AVC) model. Recall that from Section II, under
perfect synchronization, the equivalent channel model of SP-
OFDM can be expressed as
R = S + ejΘJ +N, (36)
where S ∈ Φ, J ∈ C, N ∼ CN (0, σ2I), Θ is uniformly
distributed over { 2piiM | i = 0, 1, ...,M − 1}, and CN (µ,Σ)
denotes a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution
with mean µ and variance Σ. For generality, in this section,
we do not assume any a priori information on the jamming J ,
except a finite average power constraint of PJ , i.e., E{|J |2} ≤
PJ . We will show that the AVC corresponding to SP-OFDM is
nonsymmetrizable, and hence the AVC capacity of SP-OFDM
is positive under disguised jamming.
A. AVC Symmetricity Analysis
The arbitrarily varying channel (AVC) model, first intro-
duced in [22], characterizes the communication channels with
unknown states which may vary in arbitrary manners across
time. For the jamming channel (36) of interest, the jamming
symbol J can be viewed as the state of the channel under
consideration. The channel capacity of AVC evaluates the
data rate of the channel under the most adverse jamming
interference among all the possibilities [29]. Note that unlike
the jamming free model where the channel noise sequence
is independent of the authorized signal and is independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.), the AVC model considers
the possible correlation between the authorized signal and the
jamming, as well as the possible temporal correlation among
the jamming symbols, which may cause much worse damages
to the communication.
To prove the effectiveness of the proposed SP-OFDM under
disguised jamming, we need to introduce some basic concepts
and properties of the AVC model. First we revisit the definition
of symmetrizable AVC channel.
Definition 1. [29] [30] Let W (r | s,x) denote the con-
ditional PDF of the received signal R given the transmitted
symbol s ∈ Φ and the jamming symbol x ∈ C. The AVC
channel (36) is symmetrizable iff for some auxiliary channel
pi : Φ→ C, ∀s, s′ ∈ Φ, r ∈ C, we have∫
C
W (r | s,x)dFpi(x|s′) =
∫
C
W (r | s′,x)dFpi(x|s),
(37)
where Fpi(·|·) is the probability measure of the output of
channel pi given the input, i.e., the conditional CDF
Fpi(x|s) = Pr{Re(pi(s)) ≤ Re(x), Im(pi(s)) ≤ Im(x)},
(38)
for x ∈ C, s ∈ Φ, where pi(s) denotes the output of channel
pi given input symbol s.
8We denote the set of all the auxiliary channels, pi’s, that can
symmetrize channel (36) by Π, that is,
Π =
{
pi | Eq. (37) is satisfied w.r.t. pi ∀s, s′ ∈ Φ, r ∈ C} .
(39)
With the average jamming power constraint considered
in this paper, we further introduce the definition of l-
symmetrizable channel.
Definition 2. [30] The AVC channel (36) is called l-
symmetrizable under average jamming power constraint iff
there exists a pi ∈ Π such that∫
C
|x|2dFpi(x|s) <∞, ∀s ∈ Φ. (40)
In [30], it was shown that reliable communication can be
achieved as long as the AVC channel is not l-symmetrizable.
Lemma 1. [30, Corollary 2] The deterministic coding ca-
pacity2 of AVC channel (36) is positive under any hostile
jamming with finite average power constraint iff the AVC is
not l-symmetrizable. Furthermore, given a specific average
jamming power constraint PJ , the channel capacity C in this
case equals
C = max
PS
min
FJ
I(S,R),
s.t.
∫
C |x|2dFJ(x) ≤ PJ ,
(41)
where I(S,R) denotes the mutual information (MI) between
the R and S in (36), PS denotes the probability distribution
of S over Φ and FJ(·) the CDF of J .
First, we show that the traditional OFDM system is l-
symmetrizable under disguised jamming.
Theorem 1. The traditional OFDM system is l-symmetrizable.
Therefore, the deterministic coding capacity is zero under the
worst disguised jamming with finite average jamming power.
Proof. The AVC model of the traditional OFDM system is
R = S + J +N. (42)
We will show that when S and J have the same constellation
Φ, hence the same finite average power, the AVC channel is
l-symmetrizable. It follows from (42) that
W (r | s, s′) = W (r | s′, s), ∀s, s′ ∈ Φ, r ∈ C. (43)
Since Φ has finite average power, the average power constraint
(40) is satisfied by disguised jamming. Hence, channel (42) is
l-symmetrizable. From Lemma 1, a necessary condition for a
positive AVC deterministic coding capacity is that the channel
is not l-symmetrizable. So the traditional OFDM system has
zero deterministic coding capacity under disguised jamming
with finite average jamming power.
Next, we show that with the proposed secure precoding, it
is impossible to l-symmetrize the AVC channel (36) corre-
sponding to the SP-OFDM system.
2The deterministic coding capacity is defined by the capacity that can be
achieved by a communication system, when it applies only one code pattern
during the information transmission. In other words, the coding scheme is
deterministic and can be readily repeated by other users [31].
Theorem 2. The AVC channel corresponding to the proposed
SP-OFDM is not l-symmetrizable.
Proof. We prove this result by contradiction. Suppose that
there exists a channel pi ∈ Π such that the AVC channel is
l-symmetrizable. Denote the output of channel pi given input
x by pi(x), and define the corresponding AVC channel output
for inputs s and s′ as
Rˆ(s, s′) = s+ pi(s′)ejΘ +N, (44)
where Rˆ(s, s′) denotes the channel output. Following (37),
Rˆ(s, s′) and Rˆ(s′, s) have the same distribution. Let
ϕX(ω1, ω2) denote the characteristic function (CF) of a com-
plex random variable X . So we have
ϕRˆ(s,s′)(ω1, ω2) ≡ ϕRˆ(s′,s)(ω1, ω2), (45)
and
ϕRˆ(s,s′)(ω1, ω2) = ϕ[s+pi(s′)ejΘ](ω1, ω2) ϕN (ω1, ω2), (46)
where, for the complex Gaussian noise N , we have
ϕN (ω1, ω2) = e
−σ24 (w21+w22), ω1, ω2 ∈ (−∞,+∞), (47)
which is non-zero over R2. Thus by eliminating the character-
istic functions of the Gaussian noises on both sides of equation
(45), we have
ϕ[s+pi(s′)ejΘ](ω1, ω2)=ϕ[s′+pi(s)ejΘ](ω1, ω2). (48)
for ω1, ω2 ∈ (−∞,+∞). Let s = s1 + js2, we can then
express ϕ[s+pi(s′)ejΘ](ω1, ω2) as
ϕ[s+pi(s′)ejΘ](ω1, ω2) = e
js1ω1+js2ω2ϕ[pi(s′)ejΘ](ω1, ω2),
(49)
and
ϕ[pi(s′)ejΘ](ω1, ω2)
= E{ejω1Re(pi(s′)ejΘ)+jω2Im(pi(s′)ejΘ)}
=
∫
C
E{ejω1Re(xejΘ)+jω2Im(xejΘ)}dFpi(x|s′). (50)
Recall that under the proposed secure precoding scheme, Θ is
uniformly distributed over { 2piiM | i = 0, 1, ...,M − 1}, where
M is a power of 2. We have
E{ejω1Re(xejΘ)+jω2Im(xejΘ)}
=
1
M
M−1∑
i=0
ejω1|x| cos(
2pii
M +arg(x))+jω2|x| sin( 2piiM +arg(x))
=
2
M
M/2−1∑
i=0
cos {ω1|x| cos[2pii/M + arg(x)]
+ω2|x| sin[2pii/M + arg(x)]} , (51)
which is of real value for ω1, ω2 ∈ (−∞,+∞). So
ϕ[pi(s′)ejΘ](ω1, ω2) and ϕ[pi(s)ejΘ](ω1, ω2) are also real-valued
over R2. For s 6= s′ and s′ = s′1+js′2, ej[(s1−s
′
1)ω1+(s2−s′2)ω2]
has non-zero imaginary part for (s1 − s′1)ω1 + (s2 − s′2)ω2 6=
npi, n ∈ Z. Without loss of generality, we assume s1 6= s′1.
9From (48), (49) and (51), for ω1 +
s2−s′2
s1−s′1ω2 6=
npi
s1−s′1 ,∀n ∈ Z,
we have
ϕ[pi(s)ejΘ](ω1, ω2) = 0. (52)
On the other hand, the characteristic function of an RV
should be uniformly continuous in the real domain [28,
Theorem 15.21]. So for any fixed ω2 ∈ (−∞,∞), we should
have
ϕ[pi(s)ejΘ](
npi − (s2 − s′2)ω2
s1 − s′1
, ω2)
= lim
ω1→npi−(s2−s
′
2)ω2
s1−s′1
ϕ[pi(s)ejΘ](ω1, ω2), ∀n ∈ Z. (53)
For ω1 ∈
(
(n−1)pi−(s2−s′2)ω2
s1−s′1 ,
npi−(s2−s′2)ω2
s1−s′1
)
∪(
npi−(s2−s′2)ω2
s1−s′1 ,
(n+1)pi−(s2−s′2)ω2
s1−s′1
)
, ϕ[pi(s)ejΘ](ω1, ω2) ≡ 0,
so
ϕ[pi(s)ejΘ](
npi − (s2 − s′2)ω2
s1 − s′1
, ω2) = 0, ∀n ∈ Z. (54)
Combining (52) and (54), we have
ϕ[pi(s)ejΘ](ω1, ω2) = 0, ∀ω1, ω2 ∈ (−∞,∞). (55)
However, (55) cannot be a valid characteristic function for any
RV. Therefore, the auxiliary channel pi does not exist, and Π
is empty. Hence, the AVC channel is not l-symmerizable.
Following Lemma 1, the result in Theorem 2 implies that the
proposed SP-OFDM will always have positive capacity under
any hostile jamming with finite average power constraint. The
next subsection is focused on how to calculate the channel
capacity of SP-OFDM under hostile jamming.
B. Capacity Analysis
From Lemma 1, the capacity of channel R = S+ejΘJ+N
is given by
C = max
PS
min
FJ
I(S,R),
s.t.
∫
C |x|2dFJ(x) ≤ PJ .
It is hard to obtain a closed form solution of the channel capac-
ity for a general discrete transmission alphabet Φ. However, if
we relax the distribution of the transmitted symbol S from the
discrete set Φ to the entire complex plane C under an average
power constraint, we are able to obtain the following result on
channel capacity.
Theorem 3. The deterministic coding capacity of SP-OFDM
is positive under any hostile jamming. More specifically, let
the alphabet Φ = C and the average power of S being upper
bounded by PS , then the maximin channel capacity in (41)
under average jamming power constraint PJ and noise power
PN = σ
2 is given by
C = log
(
1 +
PS
PJ + PN
)
. (56)
The capacity is achieved at input distribution CN (0, PS) and
jamming distribution CN (0, PJ).
To prove Theorem 3, we need the following lemma [30,
Lemma 4].
Lemma 2. Mutual information I(S,R) is concave with re-
spect to the input distribution FS(·) and convex with respect
to the jamming distribution FJ(·).
Proof of Theorem 3. First, following Lemma 1 and Theorem
2, we can get that the deterministic coding capacity of SP-
OFDM is positive under any hostile jamming.
Second, we will evaluate the channel capacity of SP-OFDM
under hostile jamming. When the support of S is Φ = C,
the whole complex plane, following Lemma 1, the channel
capacity in (41) equals
C = max
FS
min
FJ
I(S,R), (57)
s.t.
∫
C |x|2dFS(x) ≤ PS , (58)∫
C |x|2dFJ(x) ≤ PJ , (59)
where FS(·) denotes the CDF function of S defined on C,
and (58) and (59) denote the average power constraints on the
input and the jamming, respectively.
We denote the I(S,R) w.r.t the input distribution FS(·)
and the jamming distribution FJ(·) by φ(FS , FJ). Following
Lemma 2, φ(FS , FJ) is concave w.r.t. FS(·) and convex w.r.t.
FJ(·). As shown in [32], if we can find the input distribution
F ∗S and the jamming distribution F
∗
J such that
φ(FS , F
∗
J ) ≤ φ(F ∗S , F ∗J ) ≤ φ(F ∗S , FJ), (60)
for any FS and FJ satisfying the average power constraints
(58) and (59), respectively, then
φ(F ∗S , F
∗
J ) = C. (61)
That is, the pair (F ∗S , F
∗
J ) is the saddle point of the max-min
problem in equation (57) [33].
Assume the jamming interference is circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian with average power PJ , that is, F ∗J =
CN (0, PJ). Note that the phase shift would not change the
distribution of a complex Gaussian RV, and the fact that
the jamming J and the noise N are independent, hence
the jammed channel in this case is equivalent to a complex
AWGN channel with noise power PJ+PN , where the capacity
achieving input distribution is also a complex Gaussian with
power PS , that is, F ∗S = CN (0, PS). It follows that for any
input distribution FS satisfying the power constraint PS ,
φ(FS , CN (0, PJ)) ≤ φ(CN (0, PS), CN (0, PJ)). (62)
On the other hand, when the input distribution is F ∗S =
CN (0, PS), the worst noise in terms of capacity for Gaussian
input is Gaussian [9]. Since ejΘJ + N is complex Gaussian
with power PJ + PN if F ∗J = CN (0, PJ), then for any
jamming distribution FJ satisfying the power constraint PJ ,
φ(CN (0, PS), CN (0, PJ)) ≤ φ(CN (0, PS), FJ). (63)
So the saddle point (F ∗S , F
∗
J ) is achieved at (CN (0, PS),
CN (0, PJ)), where the corresponding channel capacity is
C = log
(
1 +
PS
PJ + PN
)
, (64)
which completes the proof.
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TABLE I: SP-OFDM parameters in numerical results (Ts: duration of OFDM body)
Carrier number Nc 128 CP1 duration TCP,1 Ts/8 CP2 duration TCP,2 Ts/16
Number of candidate phase shift offset |K| 50 Signal-to-noise ratio (dB) 15 Phase shift constellation size M 16
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Fig. 6: Correlation coefficients of SP-OFDM at different time
and phase shift sequence offsets under disguised jamming.
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Fig. 7: The synchronization error distribution under AWGN
channels with disguised jamming attack.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the synchronization and bit
error rate (BER) performances of the proposed SP-OFDM
system under disguised jamming attacks through numerical
examples. Throughout this section, we consider the case where
the malicious user generates disguised jamming using OFDM,
with the same format and power level as that of the legitimate
signal.
Example 1: Synchronization performance under dis-
guised jamming in AWGN channels: In this example, we
verify the robustness of SP-OFDM under disguised jamming
in terms of synchronization for AWGN channels. The system
parameters are listed in Table I. We first compute the average
correlation coefficients at different time offsets and phase shift
sequence offsets for the received signal as in (17), and the
result is plotted in Fig. 6 for K = 403. Here, K denotes the
number of OFDM blocks used for estimation. It shows that
with the secure precoding scheme, even under disguised jam-
3In the 802.11a WLAN [26], 40 OFDM blocks correspond to 1440 data
bytes with 64QAM mapping, while the OFDM frame length can be as large
as 2312 bytes.
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Fig. 8: The synchronization error distribution under static
multi-path fading channels with disguised jamming attack.
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Fig. 9: The synchronization error distribution under time
varying multi-path fading channels with disguised jamming
attack.
ming, the receiver is able to correctly estimate the time offset
as well as the phase shift sequence offset of the legitimate
signal. Then we simulate the synchronization accuracy of SP-
OFDM by calculating the cumulative distribution functions
(CDFs) of the estimation errors with different numbers of
OFDM blocks K to average the correlation coefficients. We
normalize the time offset by the duration of one OFDM block
Tb and the frequency offset by the sub-carrier spacing 1/Ts,
and the results are shown in Fig. 7. It can be observed that
under the given setup, with 25 OFDM blocks to compute the
correlation coefficients, the synchronization algorithm is robust
under disguised jamming, where 99% cases have less than 0.01
normalized time offset estimation errors and 98% cases have
less than 0.04 normalized frequency offset estimation errors.
Example 2: Synchronization performance under dis-
guised jamming in multi-path fading channels: In this
example, we simulate the synchronization accuracy of SP-
OFDM under disguised jamming in static and time varying
multi-path fading channels, which are modeled as 4 paths
fading channels with a maximum delay spread of 3Ts/256.
Fig. 8 shows the estimation error distribution in the static chan-
nel. A slight performance loss is observed compared with the
AWGN case, where 98% cases have less than 0.02 normalized
time offset estimation errors and 96.5% cases have less than
0.04 normalized frequency offset estimation errors using 25
OFDM blocks in estimation. To demonstrate the effectiveness
of the synchronization algorithm under slow time varying
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Fig. 10: BER performance comparison under disguised jam-
ming in AWGN channels: SP-OFDM versus the traditional
OFDM system, signal to jamming power ratio (SJR) = 0 dB.
channels, we introduce a Doppler shift to each path with a
maximum value of 2% sub-carrier spacing (0.02/Ts) in the
multi-path fading channel. Fig. 9 shows the estimation error
distribution under the time-varying multi-path fading channel,
where around 98% cases have less than 0.02 normalized
time offset estimation errors and 96.5% cases have less than
0.04 normalized frequency offset estimation errors using 30
OFDM blocks in estimation. The simulation results illustrate
the robustness of SP-OFDM against disguised jamming attacks
under various channel conditions.
Example 3: BER performance under disguised jamming
in AWGN channels: In this example, we analyze the bit error
rate (BER) of the proposed system under disguised jamming in
AWGN channels. Perfect synchronization is assumed. We use
the low density parity check (LDPC) codes for channel coding,
and adopt the parity check matrices from the DVB-S.2 stan-
dard [34]. The coded bits are mapped into QPSK symbols. The
random phase shifts in the proposed secure precoding are ap-
proximated as i.i.d. continuous RVs uniformly distributed over
[0, 2pi). We observe that such an approximation has negligible
difference on BER performance compared with a sufficiently
large M . The jammer randomly selects one of the codewords
in the LDPC codebook and sends it to the receiver after the
mapping and modulation. On the receiver side, we use a soft
decoder for the LDPC codes, where the belief propagation
(BP) algorithm [35] is employed. The likelihood information
in the BP algorithm is calculated using the likelihood function
of a general Gaussian channel, where the noise power is set
to 1 +σ2 considering the existence of the disguised jamming,
and σ2 is the noise power. That is, the signal to jamming
power ratio (SJR) is set to be 0 dB. It should be noted that for
more complicated jamming distributions or mapping schemes,
customized likelihood functions basing on the jamming dis-
tribution will be needed for the optimal performance. Fig. 10
compares the BERs of the communication system studied with
and without the proposed secure precoding under different
code rates and SNRs. It can be observed that: (i) under the
disguised jamming, in the traditional OFDM system, the BER
cannot really be reduced by decreasing the code rate or the
noise power, which indicates that without appropriate anti-
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Fig. 11: BER performance comparison under disguised jam-
ming in Rician channels: code rate = 1/3, SJR = 0 dB. Here
the K0 parameter refers to the power ratio between the direct
path and the scattered path.
jamming procedures, the traditional OFDM cannot achieve
reliable communications under disguised jamming; (ii) with
the proposed SP-OFDM scheme, when the code rates are
below certain thresholds, the BER can be significantly reduced
with the decrease of code rates using the proposed secure
precoding. This demonstrates that the proposed SP-OFDM
system can achieve a positive deterministic channel coding
capacity under disguised jamming.
Example 4: BER performance under disguised jamming
in Rician channels: In this example, we verify the effective-
ness of the proposed system in fading channels. We consider a
Rician channel, where the multipath interference is introduced
and a strong line of sight (LOS) signal exists [36]. The fading
effect is slow enough so that the channel remains unchanged
for one OFDM symbol duration. In the simulation, we set the
power of the direct path of Rician channel to be 1 and vary
the K0 parameter, which is the ratio between the power of the
direct path and that of the scattered path. Fig. 11 shows the
BERs for LDPC code rate 1/3 under disguised jamming. It can
be observed that the proposed system is still effective under
the fading channel with a sufficient large K0 parameter. For a
small K0 parameter, i.e., when the fading is severe, channel
estimation and equalization will be needed to guarantee a
reliable communication.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we designed a highly secure and efficient
OFDM system under disguised jamming, named securely
precoded OFDM (SP-OFDM), by exploiting secure symbol-
level precoding basing on phase randomization. We demon-
strated the destructive effect of disguised jamming on the
traditional OFDM system, and proved the robustness of SP-
OFDM against disguised jamming in terms of synchronization
and channel capacity. First, we showed that the traditional
OFDM cannot distinguish between the legitimate signal and
disguised jamming in the synchronization process, while SP-
OFDM, with the secure CP, can achieve accurate synchro-
nization under disguised jamming. Second, we analyzed the
channel capacity of the traditional OFDM and the proposed
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SP-OFDM under hostile jamming using the arbitrarily varying
channel (AVC) model. It was shown that the deterministic
coding capacity of the traditional OFDM is zero under the
worst disguised jamming; on the other hand, with the secure
randomness shared between the authorized transmitter and
receiver, the AVC channel corresponding to SP-OFDM is not
symmetrizable, and hence SP-OFDM can achieve a positive
capacity under disguised jamming. Both our theoretical and
numerical results demonstrated that SP-OFDM is robust under
disguised jamming and frequency selective fading. Potentially,
SP-OFDM is a promising modulation scheme for high speed
transmission under hostile environments, and the secure pre-
coding scheme proposed in this paper can also be applied to
modulation techniques other than OFDM.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Note that r(t)r∗(t+ Ts) can be calculated as
r(t)r∗(t+ Ts) = s(t− t0)s∗(t+ Ts − t0)e−jω0Ts
+ z(t)s∗(t+ Ts − t0)e−j(ω0t+ω0Ts+φ0)
+ s(t− t0)ej(ω0t+φ0)z∗(t+ Ts) + z(t)z∗(t+ Ts). (65)
In the following we analyze the four terms on the right-hand-
side (RHS) of (65) respectively.
First, define
Yk,1(τ)
4
=
∫ τ−TCP,2+kTb
τ−TCP+kTb
s(t− t0)s∗(t+ Ts − t0)dt, (66)
for k ∈ Z∗, τ ∈ [0, Tb). We evaluate the expectation of
Yk,1(τ)C˜
∗
k+d for d ∈ K. Note that for t ∈ [τ−TCP +kTb, τ−
TCP,2 + kTb], where τ ∈ [0, Tb), we have
s(t− t0) =
k+1∑
l=k−1
sl(t− t0 − lTb), (67)
s(t+ Ts − t0) =
k+1∑
l=k−1
sl(t+ Ts − t0 − lTb). (68)
Note that since the OFDM blocks are zero-mean and indepen-
dent, for k1 6= k2, we have
E
{
sk1(t1)s
∗
k2(t2)
}
= 0,∀t1, t2 ∈ R. (69)
So we focus on∫ τ−TCP,2+kTb
τ−TCP+kTb
k+1∑
l=k−1
sl(t− t0 − lTb)s∗l (t+ Ts − t0 − lTb) dt
=
1
N2c
1∑
l=−1
∫ τ−lTb−t0−TCP,2
τ−lTb−t0−TCP
Nc−1∑
i1=0
S˜l+k,i1e
j
2pii1
Ts
t
ul+k(t)
Nc−1∑
i2=0
S˜∗l+k,i2e
−j 2pii2
Ts
t
u∗l+k(t+ Ts) dt. (70)
Since for i1 6= i2, E{S˜k,i1 S˜∗k,i2} = 0, we further focus on
1
N2c
1∑
l=−1
Nc−1∑
i=0
|S˜l+k,i|2
∫ τ−lTb−t0−TCP,2
τ−lTb−t0−TCP
ul+k(t)u
∗
l+k(t+ Ts) dt.
(71)
Define function vk(τ) as
vk(τ)
4
=
∫ τ−TCP,2
τ−TCP
uk(t)u
∗
k(t+ Ts)dt
=

(τ + TCP,1)Ck, −TCP,1 ≤ τ < 0,
τ + (TCP,1 − τ)Ck, 0 ≤ τ < TCP,2,
TCP,2 + (TCP,1 − τ)Ck, TCP,2 ≤ τ < TCP,1,
TCP − τ, TCP,1 ≤ τ < TCP ,
0, otherwise.
(72)
So (71) can be expressed as
1
N2c
1∑
l=−1
Nc−1∑
i=0
|S˜l+k,i|2vl+k(τ − lTb − t0). (73)
In addition, since the phase shift symbols are zero-mean and
independent, for τ ∈ R, we have
E{vk1(τ)C∗k2} =
{
v(τ), k1 = k2,
0, k1 6= k2. (74)
So the expectation of Yk,1(τ)C˜∗k+d is
E{Yk,1(τ)C˜∗k+d} =

PS
Nc
v(τ + Tb − t0), d = k0 − 1,
PS
Nc
v(τ − t0), d = k0,
PS
Nc
v(τ − Tb − t0), d = k0 + 1,
0, otherwise.
(75)
whose maximum is achieved at τ = t0 and d = k0. In
addition, since constellation Φ is a finite set, the variance of
Yk,1(τ)C˜
∗
k+d is bounded for any possible k, τ and d, while
given τ and d,
E{Yk1,1(τ)C˜∗k1+dYk2,1(τ)C˜∗k2+d} = 0, for |k1 − k2| > 1.
(76)
So as K → ∞, the variance of 1K
∑K−1
k=0 Yk,1(t0)C˜
∗
k+k0
converges to 0, and using the Chebychev inequality, we have
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
Yk,1(t0)C˜
∗
k+k0 =
PSTCP,1
Nc
, a.s.. (77)
Second, define
Yk,2(τ)
4
=
∫ τ−TCP,2+kTb
τ−TCP+kTb
z(t)s∗(t+ Ts − t0)e−j(ω0t+ω0Ts+φ0)dt,
(78)
and
Zk,l(ω, τ, t0)
4
=
∫ τ−TCP,2
τ−TCP
z(t+ kTb)e
jωtul(t− lTb + Ts − t0)dt.
(79)
It can be derived that
Yk,2(τ) =
1∑
l=−1
Nc−1∑
i=0
e
j 2pii
Ts
[−lTb−t0]S˜k+l,iZk,l( 2piiTs − ω0, τ, t0)
Ncej(kω0Tb+ω0Ts+φ0)
.
(80)
Considering the delay in signal processing, we assume the
jamming term Zk,l( 2piiTs − ω0, τ, t0) is independent of the
transmitted symbol S˜k+l,i in (80). Therefore, we have
E{Yk,2(τ)C˜∗k+d} = 0,∀k ∈ Z∗, τ ∈ [0, Tb), d ∈ K. (81)
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Note that the fourth moment of jamming interference z(t)
is bounded, so are the variances of z(t) of Yk,2(τ)C˜∗k+d. In
addition, for τ ∈ [0, Tb), d ∈ K, we have
E{Yk1,2(τ)C˜∗k1+dY ∗k2,2(τ)C˜k2+d} = 0,∀|k1 − k2| > 1. (82)
Therefore,
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
Yk,2(τ)C˜
∗
k+d = 0,∀τ ∈ [0, Tb), d ∈ K, a.s.. (83)
Third, define
Yk,3(τ)
4
=
∫ τ−TCP,2+kTb
τ−TCP+kTb
s(t− t0)ej(ω0t+φ0)z∗(t+ Ts)dt.
Following the same argument as in the derivation of (83) on
Yk,2(τ), we have
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
Yk,3(τ)C˜
∗
k+d = 0,∀τ ∈ [0, Tb), d ∈ K, a.s.. (84)
At last, we define
Yk,4(τ)
4
=
∫ τ−TCP,2+kTb
τ−TCP+kTb
z(t)z∗(t+ Ts)dt.
Considering the security of phase shift sequence Ck and the
delay in signal processing, we assume that for t ≤ (k+1)Tb+
Ts − TCP,2, the jammer is unable to recover C˜k+d,∀d ∈ K.
Since the fourth moment of z(t) is bounded, we can have
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
Yk,4(τ)C˜
∗
k+d = 0,∀τ ∈ [0, Tb), d ∈ K, a.s.. (85)
In conclusion, by averaging the correlation coefficients
Yk(τ, d) over multiple OFDM blocks, (18) can be ob-
tained.
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